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he purpose of this paper1 is to examine the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law and the law of neutrality to Operation Allied
Force, the NATO campaign over Kosovo in 1999. The paper is thus chiefly
about jus in bello (which is treated here as synonymous with the law of armed
conflict and international humanitarian law), not about jus ad bellum. It is not
intended, therefore, to enter into the controversy regarding the legality of the
decision to resort to force over Kosovo or the long-running debate over
whether contemporary international law recognizes a right of humanitarian
intervention in the face of large scale violations of human rights. The present
writer has already made clear in other publications his view that a right of
humanitarian intervention (albeit one of a strictly limited character) exists in
1. This paper has been revised since the colloquium in order to take account of points made by a
number of commentators in the immensely valuable discussion periods, although the
responsibility for the views here expressed remain mine alone. I have also taken the opportunity
to take account of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic v. Belgium
and Others delivered on December 19, 2001 since that decision is directly concerned with the
Kosovo conflict. Conflicts occurring since Kosovo are not discussed here.
international law and that the conditions for the exercise of that right were
present in Kosovo in 1999,2 although that view is by no means universal.3
That, however, is a debate for another occasion. For present purposes, it is
sufficient—but also necessary—to note three points regarding the legal justifi-
cation advanced by the NATO States for their resort to force, since these
points have a bearing on the application of international humanitarian law
and the law of neutrality during the campaign.
First, the Kosovo campaign was one in which some actions against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were undertaken pursuant to a mandate
from the United Nations Security Council, while others were taken by the
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2. See Christopher Greenwood, Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, 1999-2000, HC Paper 28-II, p. 137, reprinted in 49
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 926 (2000), and Humanitarian
Intervention: the Case of Kosovo, 10 FINNISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(forthcoming).
3. Amongst the literature on the subject, which reflects the very different positions taken by a
wide range of international lawyers, see the evidence given by Ian Brownlie, Christine Chinkin
and Vaughan Lowe to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom House of
Commons, supra note 2, reprinted in 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 876–943 (2000); Louis Henkin, Ruth Wedgwood, Jonathan Charney, Christine
Chinkin, Richard Falk, Thomas Franck and W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments: NATO’s
Kosovo Intervention, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 824–878 (1999); Bruno
Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1999) and A Follow-Up: Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, id., at 791; Nico Krisch, Unilateral
Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONS LAW 59 (1999); Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO’s Application of Armed
Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 330 (2000); Steven Blockmans, Moving into UNchartered Waters: An Emerging Right
of Unilateral Intervention?, 12 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (1999); and
Francesco Francioni, Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law After Kosovo, 4 YEARBOOK
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 107 (2000). The Kosovo crisis has also attracted an unusual number
of studies by official and semi-official bodies. These include the report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United Kingdom House of Commons, HOUSE OF COMMONS PAPER
(1999–2000) NO. 28-I together with the response by the United Kingdom Government at
COMMAND PAPERS 4825 (August 2000); the report of the Advisory Council on International
Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law of the Netherlands
Government, Report No. 13 (April 2000), available at http://www.aiv-advice.nl (reviewed by Ige
Dekker in 6 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 115 (2001)); the report of the Danish
Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects
(1999); and the Kosovo Report published by the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (2000).
NATO States on their own initiative. The Security Council had imposed an
arms embargo on the FRY when it adopted Resolution 1160 in 1998, a year
before the NATO military action commenced. After the cessation of the
bombing campaign on June 10, 1999, the Council adopted Resolution 1244,
which provided the legal basis for ground forces led by NATO and known as
KFOR, to enter Kosovo and assume responsibility for the security situation
there, to the exclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary police of the FRY.
The bombing campaign itself, however, was not authorized by the Council.
Although that campaign was undertaken by NATO in support of goals identi-
fied by the Security Council in Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 (all of which
contained provisions which were legally binding upon all States, including the
FRY), none of those resolutions authorized military action. Unlike the situa-
tion in the 1990–91 Gulf conflict, therefore, Operation Allied Force was not a
case of enforcement action taken with the authority of the Security Council.
A distinction must accordingly be drawn between the bombing campaign
which occurred between March 24, 1999 and June 10, 1999, on the one hand,
and the military presence in Kosovo thereafter. As will be seen, this distinc-
tion is of some importance in considering the law applicable to military opera-
tions after June 10, 1999.
Secondly, while some members of NATO were more forthright on this
matter than were others, the only substantial justification advanced for the
decision to resort to military action was that such action was justified as a re-
sponse to the humanitarian situation which had been created in Kosovo in the
immediate run-up to the commencement of Operation Allied Force on March
24, 1999. For example, the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to
the United Nations told the Security Council, on the day that the military op-
eration commenced, that:
The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent
an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in
Kosovo, there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent.
Renewed acts of repression by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
would cause further loss of civilian life and would lead to displacement of the
civilian population on a large scale and in hostile conditions.
Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In these
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force
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now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe,
and is the minimum judged necessary for that purpose.4
The emphasis on the limited purpose for which force was being employed
and the reference, inherent in that statement, to the requirement that the
force used should be proportionate to that goal has led some commentators to
argue that the application of international humanitarian law in the NATO
operation should have been different from that required of States engaged in a
“normal” armed conflict. That argument is considered later in this paper.
Finally, it needs to be remembered that, while the jus ad bellum and the jus
in bello are separate bodies of law (a fact which has important legal conse-
quences), for military action by a State to be lawful, it must comply with both
bodies of law. The Gulf conflict of 1990–91 may be used as an illustration.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was the clearest possible violation of the jus ad
bellum. It followed that the subsequent occupation of Kuwait and the Iraqi re-
sistance to the coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait were also a violation of
the jus ad bellum, even though some aspects of Iraq’s behavior (e.g., some of
the property requisitions which occurred or the missile attacks on the Dahran
airbase) complied with the jus in bello.5 Thus, Iraq’s liability to make repara-
tion in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 for
the consequences of its unlawful invasion is not confined to damages caused
by acts unlawful under the jus in bello.
In this context, it has to be recognized that there was considerable contro-
versy about the legal justification advanced by the NATO States for their re-
sort to force against the FRY. That controversy about the application of the
jus ad bellum may have affected the way in which certain issues regarding the
jus in bello and, in particular, the law of neutrality were perceived. Specifically,
it may have affected the approach of various governments to the question
whether the NATO States would have been entitled to impose an embargo on
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4. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988, at 12. See also the views expressed in the same debate by the
Permanent Representatives of the United States of America (4-5), Canada (6) and the
Netherlands (8). In the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force brought by the FRY against ten
of the NATO States in the International Court of Justice, Belgium advanced the same
justification for military action; see Oral Pleadings of Belgium (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J.
CR/99/15, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm. The other
respondent States did not address this issue during that phase of the case.
5. For a discussion of these issues, see Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The
Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MODERN LAW REVIEW 153–178 (1992) and the
articles cited at note 38, infra.
shipments of oil and other supplies to the FRY, even where those supplies
were carried in ships flying the flags of States not involved in the conflict.
This paper will first consider the applicability of international humanitarian
law to Operation Allied Force before examining certain general issues regard-
ing the manner in which that law had to be applied in the Kosovo campaign.
The question whether persons captured during the operation were prisoners
of war within the Third Geneva Convention will be addressed next, followed
by discussion of the issue of a naval embargo and the law of neutrality. The le-
gal regime applicable to KFOR operations in Kosovo since June 10, 1999 will
be briefly considered before closing with a discussion of the various judicial
proceedings relating to the conduct of the Kosovo conflict. Questions of tar-
geting and proportionality are considered only in passing, as these are the sub-
ject of other papers in the present volume.6
The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law
1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict between the NATO States and the
FRY
The first question to consider is whether international humanitarian law
was applicable to Operation Allied Force. Though much discussed at the
time, there is less to this question than meets the eye. The answer—which can
be given without qualification—is that international humanitarian law was
fully applicable from the moment that Operation Allied Force began on
March 24, 1999 until the cessation of hostilities on June 10, 1999. Through-
out that period an international armed conflict existed between the FRY on
the one hand and the NATO States on the other.
There is no definition of an international armed conflict in any of the trea-
ties on international humanitarian law. It is agreed, however, that the concept
is a factual one based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or more
States, even if those hostilities are at a low level and of short duration. The Ap-
peals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) has stated that an “armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States.”7 That test was undoubtedly satisfied in the
case of Operation Allied Force. The fact that no declaration of war was made
was, of course, irrelevant to the applicability of international humanitarian law
39
Christopher Greenwood
6. See the papers by Professors Bothe and Dinstein and Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery on
targeting and by Professors Bring and Murphy on collateral damage.
7. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction, 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 453, ¶ 70 (1997). See
also COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960).
to that conflict. It is well established that it is the fact of armed conflict be-
tween two or more States, not the formality of a declaration of war (which has
been almost unknown since 1945) which triggers the application of that law.8
Nor does it make any difference to the applicability of international humani-
tarian law that the decision to resort to force was taken by the North Atlantic
Council, the governing body of NATO, or that the military conduct of the cam-
paign was in the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
and the NATO military authorities, who acted in consultation with the NATO
Secretary-General under the authority given them by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil. While NATO is an international organization which possesses a legal person-
ality separate from those of its members, that separate personality does not affect
the applicability of international humanitarian law to the armed forces of any
member State which implements a NATO decision.9 That fact was expressly rec-
ognized both by NATO and the member States during Operation Allied Force.
Thus, the North Atlantic Council’s authorization to SACEUR and the military
authorities expressly required that operations were to be conducted in accor-
dance with international humanitarian law. Similarly, the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment stated that “action by our forces is in strict conformity with international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols.”10 Other NATO governments adopted a similar position.
The fact that NATO acted for humanitarian reasons, so that the legal justifi-
cation offered for the decision to resort to force was different from the reliance on
self-defense or Security Council authorization which has been characteristic of
most armed conflicts since 1945, is also irrelevant to the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law. The principle that international humanitarian law
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8. See Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in International Law, 36 INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 283 (1987). US forces are specifically required to comply
with international humanitarian law in any armed conflict, irrespective of its formal
characterization; see Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive
5100.77, Dec. 9, 1998 and ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 290–1 (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999)
(Vol. 73, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
9. Whether it affects the issue of State responsibility for a violation of those rules is currently
under consideration in the proceedings in the International Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights discussed later in this paper. No one, however, has suggested that armed
forces operating under NATO command and control are not subject to customary international
humanitarian law and the treaty provisions binding upon the State concerned.
10. Answer to a Parliamentary question on May 18, 1999 by Baroness Symons, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 70 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 605 (1999).
applies equally to both sides of a conflict irrespective of the reasons for resort to
force or its legality is one of the best established principles of the jus in bello.11
It follows that the humanitarian law of international armed conflicts was
applicable throughout the period March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999 to the hos-
tilities between the NATO States and the FRY. Two questions, however, re-
quire further consideration.
2. The Status of the FRY as a Party to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I
The first question concerns the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and Protocol I of 1977.12 This question arises because of the peculiar sta-
tus of the FRY at the relevant time. The FRY was one of the States which
emerged from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
when that State collapsed in 1991–92. Of the six republics which had made up
the SFRY, four—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and
Slovenia—had declared their independence between June 1991 and May
1992 and had, in due course, been recognized and admitted as members of the
United Nations. The two remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro,
formed the FRY. The Government of the FRY from its foundation until the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 considered the FRY to be the con-
tinuation of the old SFRY (just as the Russian Federation was the continua-
tion of the USSR) and not a successor State. It therefore maintained that the
FRY continued the SFRY’s membership in all international organizations and
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11. See, e.g., the decision of the United States Military Tribunal in United States v. List, 8 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1234, 1247. See also Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Preamble to which states that “the provisions of the Geneva Conventions . . .
and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by
those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict.” Protocol
Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
12. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR supra note 11, at 197 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, id. at 222 [hereinafter Geneva II];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, id. at 244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
id. at 301 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. Protocol I, supra note 11.
that all treaties concluded by the SFRY, including the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I, continued to apply to the FRY without any need for an act of
succession. Accordingly, whereas the other States which emerged from the
SFRY each made a declaration of succession to the Conventions and Proto-
cols, the FRY did not.
The FRY’s claim to be the continuation of the SFRY was not, however, ac-
cepted by the rest of the international community. Thus, the Arbitration
Commission of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (known as
“the Badinter Commission” after the name of its Chairman, Judge Robert
Badinter of the French Constitutional Court) rejected the FRY’s claim and
gave the opinion that the States which emerged from the SFRY were all suc-
cessor States, none of which had any special claim to continue the personality
of the old State.13 The United Nations Security Council and General Assem-
bly also rejected the FRY’s claim and stated that it should apply for member-
ship of the United Nations.14 The then Government of the FRY, however,
adhered to its position that it continued the personality of the SFRY and thus
continued to be bound by, and to have the benefit of, all of the latter’s treaty
obligations. Thus, in the cases brought against it in the International Court of
Justice by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for alleged violations of the Geno-
cide Convention, it did not contest that it was bound by that Convention.15
The FRY took the same position in the cases which it brought against ten
NATO States in 1999.16
The change of government in the FRY in 2000 brought a complete reversal
of this position. The post-Milosevic government accepted that the FRY was a
new State, one of five successors to the SFRY. In October 2000 it applied for,
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13. Opinions 9 and 10, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 203, 206 (1998); 31
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1488 (1998). See Michael Wood, Participation of Former
Yugoslav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral Treaties, 1 YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONS LAW 231 (1997).
14. S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); S.C. Res. 777 (Sep. 19, 1992),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992); S.C. Res. 821 (Apr. 28, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/821 (1993); and
G.A. Res. 47/1 (Sep. 22, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992).
15. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595 (Preliminary Objections) and 1997 I.C.J. 243
(Counter-claims); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Yugo.), available on the ICJ website at http://www.icj-cij.org. At
the time this was written, the Court had not held hearings on the merits of the Bosnian case or
taken any substantive decision in the Croatian case.
16. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
and was admitted to, membership of the United Nations.17 On March 8, 2001,
the new government deposited an instrument of accession to the Genocide
Convention, which became effective ninety days later in accordance with Ar-
ticle XIII of the Convention. By the same instrument, the FRY entered a res-
ervation to Article IX (the provision which confers jurisdiction on the
International Court of Justice). The FRY subsequently applied to the Interna-
tional Court under Article 61 of the Court’s Statute to re-open the jurisdic-
tion phase of the Bosnia case on the grounds that the FRY had not been bound
by the Genocide Convention at the relevant times and had never been bound
by Article IX.18 At the time of writing, the Court had not taken any decision
regarding this application.
The FRY had, however, been treated throughout the Kosovo conflict as a
party to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols both by other States (includ-
ing the NATO States) and by the ICRC, which sent a formal note to the FRY
and the NATO member States on March 24, 1999 reminding them of their
obligations under the Geneva Conventions.19
On October 16, 2001, the new government of the FRY deposited with the
Swiss Federal Government a declaration regarding the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols. In contrast to the position taken by the new government with
regard to the Genocide Convention, however, this declaration was an instru-
ment of succession, not accession. Moreover, it was expressly made retrospec-
tive, stating that it took effect as from April 27, 1992. Any element of doubt
which might therefore have arisen regarding the status of the FRY as a party to
the Geneva Conventions and Protocols is therefore removed. The new gov-
ernment had earlier deposited instruments of succession to a large number of
multilateral conventions.
Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions were applicable to all the States in-
volved in the conflict, while Protocol I applied as between the FRY and those
NATO States which were parties to it (all of them except France, Turkey and
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17. S.C. Res. 1326 (Oct. 31, 2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1326 (2000); G.S. Res. 55/12 (Nov. 1,
2000), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/12 (2000).
18. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 (23
April 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
19. ICRC Press Release 99/15, Mar. 24, 1999, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
news_by_date.
the United States of America).20 The customary law of armed conflict was also
applicable.
3. The Relationship between NATO and the KLA/UCK
The second question concerns the extent to which the hostilities between
the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) were governed by
international humanitarian law. There is little doubt that, even before the
start of Operation Allied Force, an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between
the FRY and the KLA/UCK. The possibility that such a conflict might exist
was impliedly recognized by the Security Council as early as March 1998,
when it urged the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) “to begin gathering information relating to the vio-
lence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction.”21 Since the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction is largely confined to crimes committed in armed conflict,22 this
invitation appears to have proceeded on the basis that, at least, an armed con-
flict might already exist. The events of early 1999 also strongly suggested that
an armed conflict existed within Kosovo.23
At least until March 24, 1999, that conflict was of a non-international char-
acter, since it consisted of “protracted armed violence between governmental
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20. France became a party to Protocol I in 2001. Peter Kovacs, Intervention armée des forces
del’OTAN au Kosovo, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 103 (2000), argues that
the United States had agreed to comply with Protocol I and was therefore bound by it. This
argument is unconvincing. It confuses the willingness (and, indeed, the obligation) of the United
States to apply the rules of customary international law codified in some of the provisions of
Protocol I with a declaration of readiness to apply the entire Protocol as such. The United States
has never agreed to apply all of the provisions of Protocol I.
21. S.C. Res. 1160 ¶ 17 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).
22. The existence of an armed conflict is an inherent feature of grave breaches (Article 2 of the
Tribunal’s Statute) and war crimes (Article 3); it is also expressly required as a condition for
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity (Article 5). Only genocide (Article 4) can be
prosecuted in the Tribunal without the need to demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict.
The ICTY was created by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 827 (May 25,
1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The ICTY Statute and the Secretary-General’s
Commentaries are contained in the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (May 3, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1163, 1192 (1993).
23. See the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic and others issued by the Prosecutor on May
22, 1999 and confirmed by Judge Hunt on May 24, 1999 (IT-99-37-I). Note also the ICRC
statement of January 18, 1999 regarding the massacre at Racak, which called on “both sides to
comply with international humanitarian law and to spare those not, or no longer, involved in the
fighting.” ICRC Press Release 99/04, Jan. 18, 1999, available at the ICRC website, supra note 19.
authorities and organized armed groups . . . within a State.”24 As such, it was
governed by the provisions of common Article 3 and the customary law appli-
cable to non-international conflicts.25 Although the KLA/UCK has at
times claimed to be a national liberation movement, so that its struggle for
self-determination would constitute an international armed conflict under
Article 1(4) of Protocol I, that claim has not been accepted by the interna-
tional community.26
The question is whether the intervention of NATO on March 24, 1999
“internationalized” that conflict, so that all the hostilities became subject to
the law applicable to international armed conflicts considered above. The
ICTY has recognized, in its two decisions in the Tadic case,27 that an interna-
tional armed conflict can co-exist alongside a non-international one and that
the latter will be internationalized only if there is a clear relationship between
the non-governmental party to that conflict and one of the States party to the
international conflict. While the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber on the
nature of that relationship is open to criticism, the requirement that some
kind of relationship exist is surely right—the mere fact that a conflict between
States comes into being alongside a conflict within one of those States cannot,
in and of itself, be sufficient to make the law of international armed conflicts
applicable to the latter. At least until the end of May 1999, however, NATO
kept its distance from the KLA/UCK and even after that time it is far from
clear that the relations between them were sufficiently close for the conflict
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24. The definition of a non-international armed conflict given by the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Tadic, supra note 7, ¶ 70.
25. It is more doubtful whether Protocol II applied. Until the closing stages of the fighting, it is
unclear whether the KLA/UCK exercised sufficient control over a defined area of territory to
meet the requirements of Article 1(1) of Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 11, at 483 [hereinafter Protocol II].
26. It is noticeable, for example, that none of the NATO States argued that the KLA/UCK was
a national liberation movement or that the population of Kosovo had a right to
self-determination, nor is such a view reflected in the various UN Security Council resolutions
regarding Kosovo. The Prosecutor has not charged Slobodan Milosevic with grave breaches
under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute—the only offense within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
which can only be committed in an international armed conflict (Tadic, supra note 7)—in
respect of Kosovo, even though some of the incidents in Kosovo in early 1999 (such as the
massacre of forty-five villagers at Racak on January 15, 1999 (U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1999/2)) would
appear to have qualified as a grave breach had there been an international conflict.
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995), 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
419 (1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic (Merits), 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1518 (1999).
between the KLA/UCK and the FRY to be regarded as part of the interna-
tional armed conflict, rather than a separate internal conflict governed by a
different set of rules.28
Application of International Humanitarian Law in the Kosovo Conflict
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the law of interna-
tional armed conflicts (both the customary law and that contained in the rele-
vant treaties) was applicable to the Kosovo conflict. Since it is a well
established principle that international humanitarian law applies equally to
both sides in a conflict, irrespective of the lawfulness of the resort to force or
the purpose for which force is used, it should follow that there was nothing
special about the application of international humanitarian law in the Kosovo
campaign.29
That means, in particular, that the two main principles of targeting—dis-
tinction and proportionality—were applicable throughout. While these prin-
ciples are discussed in greater detail in other papers in the present volume, it is
useful to recall the way in which they are formulated in Protocol I, which is
generally regarded as stating the customary law on the subject. The principle
of distinction is evident throughout Articles 48 to 58 of the Protocol but three
provisions are particularly important:
Article 48
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.
Article 51(2)
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
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28. On the subject of prisoners captured by the KLA and handed over to NATO forces, see infra
this paper.
29. The principle of equal application is clearly stated in the List case, supra note 11, and was
more recently reaffirmed in the Preamble to Protocol I, supra note 11.
Article 52(2)
Attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
The principle of proportionality is succinctly stated in Article 51(5)(b),
which prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated.”
Two very different schools of thought have suggested that the purpose of
the NATO intervention and the unusual character of the conflict meant that
the rules of international humanitarian law—and, in particular, these rules of
distinction and proportionality—were to be applied in a manner different
from that in other recent conflicts such as the 1990–91 hostilities in the Gulf.
The purpose for which NATO employed force—to halt the attacks on the
Kosovars and to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—has al-
ready been considered. The unusual character of the conflict may be said to
have manifested itself in two ways. First, for most of the period of Operation
Allied Force, the ability of the NATO States directly to influence events on
the ground in Kosovo was very limited. With no ground forces available for
immediate deployment, they were obliged to rely on air power and their ability
to strike effectively at the FRY forces engaged in the process of ethnic cleans-
ing in Kosovo was limited, at least until the closing stages of the conflict. In-
stead, their strategy was to attack targets throughout much of the FRY in
order to bring about a change of policy on the part of the FRY government.
Secondly, while the FRY’s anti-aircraft defenses continued to attack
NATO aircraft throughout the conflict, the FRY did not attack the territory
of any of the NATO States, nor, apart from the capture of a US patrol on the
border between the FRY and Macedonia, did it conduct any operations
against NATO forces anywhere outside the FRY. The result was that the con-
flict was exceptionally one-sided—in contrast, for example, to the Gulf con-
flict, where Iraq launched missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and other
coalition States, as well as against Israel.
The purpose for which NATO resorted to force and these unusual charac-
teristics of the conflict have led to two very different theories, each of which
suggests a departure from the normal principles of the law of armed conflict
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and each of which, in this writer’s view, is a heresy which demands emphatic
rejection.
The first of these heresies is that NATO’s motives and the manner in
which it was obliged to fight the conflict permitted it a greater latitude in
choosing the targets which it would attack than would otherwise be the case.
In particular, since the purpose of the bombing campaign was not to defeat the
FRY armed forces (in the normal sense of that term, i.e., by successfully engag-
ing them in battle) but to produce a change of policy on the part of the FRY
Government, objects whose destruction was particularly likely to increase the
pressure on the FRY Government were legitimate targets in this conflict irre-
spective of whether they fell within the definition of military objectives codi-
fied in Article 52(2) of Protocol I. An important part of this thesis is that
attacks carried out in order to undermine support amongst the enemy civilian
population for the policy of its government would be lawful.
Tempting though such an approach may be, it is difficult to reconcile with
contemporary international humanitarian law. As demonstrated above, the
principle that the enemy civilian population and individual civilians are not
themselves legitimate targets is now clearly established in that law.30 More-
over, the definition of a military objective requires both that the object in
question make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action and
that the destruction or damage of the object offers a definite military advan-
tage to the State whose forces attack it.31 Nothing in any of the treaties on the
law of armed conflict or the practice of States suggests that a State’s motives
or the fact that it seeks to procure a change in its adversary’s policy rather
than that adversary’s total defeat can expand the range of targets which is law-
fully open to it. It follows that an object does not become a target simply be-
cause of its political significance or the effect which its destruction is likely to
have on civilian morale and support for a hostile government. Only something
which meets the criteria of a military objective laid down by international hu-
manitarian law may lawfully be attacked.
That does not mean that the political effect (including the effect on enemy
morale) of attacking a particular target cannot legitimately be taken into con-
sideration. Provided that the target constitutes a military objective and the
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principle of proportionality contained in humanitarian law is respected,32 it is
entirely legitimate to seek to undermine the will of and support for the en-
emy’s government. But the desire to achieve that goal cannot convert into a
lawful target something which does not otherwise meet those criteria. It is
noteworthy that none of the NATO governments suggested otherwise.33
The rival heresy is that, because the campaign was fought for a humanitar-
ian objective, international humanitarian law has to be interpreted as impos-
ing upon NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been
the case. Such an approach is apparent in the report of the Independent Inter-
national Commission on Kosovo (an unofficial body of non-governmental
commentators established at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Sweden).
As part of what it describes as a “Framework for Principled Humanitarian In-
tervention,” the Report proposes that in cases of humanitarian intervention
“there must be even stricter adherence to the laws of war and international
humanitarian law than in standard military operations.”34
This suggestion (which is admittedly made de lege ferenda) is open to criti-
cism on at least three grounds. First, there is something distinctly woolly-
minded about the whole idea. The Report does not appear to suggest that the
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to a force engaging in hu-
manitarian intervention should differ from those applicable to forces engaged
in other military operations, but rather that those rules should be more strictly
applied. Yet the idea that the law can prescribe the same rules for all types of
military operations but require a higher standard of adherence in some cases
than in others is untenable. International humanitarian law requires that,
whenever it applies, it should be complied with. One violation may, of course,
be less serious than another and, as a matter of fact, one force may have a
better record of compliance than another. It is, however, illogical and contrary
to principle to say that the law requires one party to comply with all of the
rules which are binding upon it but requires another party—albeit bound by
all of the same rules—to comply only with some, or to comply with all but to a
lesser degree. In reality what the Commission is proposing is that differ-
ent—and stricter—rules should apply to a State which resorts to force by way
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of humanitarian intervention than to one which resorts to force for any other
purpose. But the Commission’s proposal begs many questions about which
rules are involved and what degree of modification might be involved.
Secondly, whichever way the Commission’s suggestion is put, it would have
the effect of driving a coach and horses through the principle that interna-
tional humanitarian law applies equally to both sides in any conflict, without
regard to the cause which they espouse or the legality of their action under the
jus ad bellum. A State whose forces were resisting humanitarian intervention by
another State or group of States would, presumably, be required to comply with
the normal rules of international humanitarian law (or to display the normally
required degree of adherence). It would therefore be entitled to a greater de-
gree of latitude than its opponent. The implications of the Commission’s pro-
posal in this respect are concealed by the unusual circumstances of the Kosovo
conflict. As has already been noted, the FRY did not respond by force against
the NATO States (other than by the use of anti-aircraft fire) and did not at-
tack the NATO States themselves. It would be naive, however, to assume that
the same conditions will necessarily apply in any future humanitarian interven-
tion. Indeed, had NATO proceeded to a ground campaign, it would not have
been the case in the Kosovo conflict, as the FRY could, and almost certainly
would, have put up a strenuous resistance to NATO ground forces.
Thirdly, the effect of the Commission’s suggestion would be that interna-
tional humanitarian law would impose greater constraints on a State engaging
in humanitarian intervention than on a State which acted in self-defense or
even one which invaded a neighbor in clear violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. It is not immediately obvious why an aggressor
should be subject to less rigorous rules in respect, for example, of targeting
than a State which intervenes to prevent genocide or other large-scale viola-
tions of human rights.
A more sophisticated suggestion is canvassed by Professor Bothe in a cri-
tique of the Report to the Prosecutor.35 After examining the Report’s findings
regarding the NATO campaign, Professor Bothe states:
Both in relation to the question of the definition of the military objective and in
relation to the proportionality principle, the report fails to raise yet another
fundamental question. Do traditional considerations of military necessity and
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military advantage have a legitimate place in a conflict the declared purpose of
which is a humanitarian one, namely to promote the cause of human rights? The
thought would deserve further consideration that in such a conflict, more
severe restraints would be imposed on the choice of military targets and of the
balancing test applied for the purposes of the proportionality principle than in a
‘normal’ armed conflict.36
The reasoning which seems to underlie this proposal can be summarized as
follows: humanitarian intervention, in so far as it justifies military action at all,
does so only for strictly limited purposes. It follows that only military action
which serves those limited purposes is legitimate and the traditional consider-
ations of military advantage and military necessity must be adapted (and cir-
cumscribed) accordingly. In effect, it requires reading the definition of a
military objective codified in Article 52(2) of Protocol I and the statement of
the proportionality principle in Article 51(5)(b) as though they referred to a
legitimate military advantage.
Professor Bothe’s approach37 avoids the first objection raised in relation to
the Kosovo Commission proposals but it still falls foul of the other two objec-
tions and must therefore be rejected. As soon as one qualifies the concept of
military advantage (or military necessity) by reference to considerations of le-
gitimacy drawn from the purpose for which a party resorts to force, the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello become inextricably mixed and the principle of
equal application of international humanitarian law is fatally compromised. If
a State, whose resort to force is in jus ad bellum terms lawful only for strictly
limited purposes, violates the jus in bello whenever it attacks a target whose de-
struction will not contribute to the achievement of those purposes, it follows
that a State whose resort to force is unlawful under the jus ad bellum will vio-
late the jus in bello whenever it targets anything. Yet that is precisely the argu-
ment which was advanced and comprehensively rejected both in the trials at
the end of World War Two and in the negotiation of Protocol I.
The difficulties, both practical and theoretical, of such an approach are ob-
vious when one asks what standards would have been applicable to attacks by
the FRY on targets in the NATO States had such attacks been carried out
during the Kosovo conflict. The FRY was plainly not acting by way of humani-
tarian intervention. Would its actions therefore have been judged by
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reference to the modified jus in bello considered to apply to a humanitarian in-
tervention or would they have been subject to the jus in bello applicable in a
“normal” armed conflict? Neither answer would be at all satisfactory, for the
first treats the FRY as engaged in an activity which was entirely alien to it
while the second would mean that the FRY would enjoy greater latitude in
targeting than the NATO States for no apparent reason. It is only because the
circumstances of the Kosovo conflict were such that the FRY was not, in prac-
tice, able to attack the NATO States that these difficulties were obscured.
That is not to say that the legal basis for resort to force has no bearing on
the manner in which that force may be used. As the statement by the United
Kingdom Representative, quoted in Part I above, makes clear, the force used
in humanitarian intervention has to be necessary in order to achieve the goal
of ending (or preventing) the humanitarian emergency. In other words, the
purpose for which force is permitted under the jus ad bellum—in the case of
Kosovo, a humanitarian purpose—limits the degree of force which may be
used. However, this recognition of the relationship between the degree of
force used and the goal to be achieved is different from the suggestion ad-
vanced by Professor Bothe in two important respects.
First, considerations of necessity and proportionality here operate as part of the
jus ad bellum, not the jus in bello. This is much more than a theoretical distinction
and has important practical consequences. It leaves intact the jus in bello defini-
tion of what constitutes a military objective and such concepts as military neces-
sity and proportionality for the purposes of Article 51(5)(b). The proportionality
limitation in the jus ad bellum measures the use of force as a whole against the
yardstick of what is proportionate to the overall goal to be achieved; it does not re-
quire analysis of each individual attack by reference to that overall goal. More-
over, the limits of the jus ad bellum, unlike those of the jus in bello, do not carry
with them the possibility of criminal sanctions for individual servicemen. Sec-
ondly, a requirement that the force used must be proportionate to the goal to be
achieved is not confined to humanitarian intervention. Proportionality in this
sense is also a requirement of the law of self-defense.38
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Both of the “heretical” views considered here are the product of under-
standable (though largely contradictory) concerns but they involve an unjus-
tified muddling of jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues in a way which is contrary
to principle and unsupported by authority. In this writer’s view, the true posi-
tion can be stated very simply: the NATO States and the FRY were bound to
comply with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law in this con-
flict, as they would have been in any other—nothing more or less.
Prisoners of War
Issues concerning prisoners of war arose in two contexts during the Kosovo
conflict. First, three US soldiers serving with the multinational peacekeeping
force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were cap-
tured by FRY forces on March 31, 1999. Secondly, two members of the FRY
forces captured by the KLA/UCK were subsequently handed over to United
States forces who held them for a short period. Both cases gave rise to a degree
of confusion about the status of the prisoners, which is surprising in view of
the clarity of the Third Geneva Convention. In both cases the status of those
concerned as prisoners of war entitled to the full protection of the Convention
should never have been in doubt.
At the time of their capture, the three US soldiers were serving in a multi-
national peacekeeping force in the FYROM. That force had originally been a
United Nations one (UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)) but
in February 1999 the People’s Republic of China had vetoed the Security
Council resolution required to renew the mandate of UNPREDEP, because of
the FYROM’s diplomatic links with Taiwan. The contingents which had com-
posed UNPREDEP had remained in the FYROM at the request of its govern-
ment and had reconstituted themselves as a multinational force outside
United Nations control. At the time of their capture, the three US soldiers
were not involved in the military operations against the FRY and were con-
ducting a patrol as part of the multinational force’s operations. There was
some doubt as to whether at the time of their capture they had inadvertently
strayed into the FRY or whether they were captured in the territory of the
FYROM.
Neither their membership in the multinational force nor the place of their
capture, however, affects their status. Under Article 4A(1) of the Third Con-
vention, members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who have
“fallen into the power of the enemy” automatically have the status of prisoners
of war. The three US servicemen were undoubtedly members of the US armed
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forces and the United States was clearly a party to an armed conflict with the
FRY at the time of their capture. Moreover, it is difficult to think of words
more apt to describe what happened to the three than that they had “fallen
into the power of the enemy.” Nothing in the Convention, or the subsequent
practice in its interpretation leaves any room for excluding them on the
ground that they were not involved in the conflict itself or that they were
members of a non-United Nations peacekeeping force.
Nor would their status be affected by the fact that they were captured in the
FYROM. Whether the FYROM was, strictly speaking, a neutral State is a
controversial question but even if it was, the place of their capture does not af-
fect the applicability of the Convention. If the FYROM was properly regarded
as a neutral State, then the FRY incursion into its territory which resulted in
the capture of the three would have been unlawful but the status of prisoner of
war is made contingent on the fact of being in the hands of an enemy, not the
legality of the means by which that was accomplished.
In these circumstances, it is surprising and disturbing that there was ever
any doubt about the status of the three captured soldiers. James Burger has
commented that “[s]ome persons thought initially that it would be better to
assert that the captured soldiers were illegal detainees, allowing the United
States to demand their immediate release, rather than waiting until the end of
active hostilities”39 but that the United States instead took the position that
the men were prisoners of war, which he describes as “the right decision.” It
was certainly that but the point needs to be emphasized that the status of the
three as prisoners of war was an automatic consequence of the fact that they
met the requirements of the Convention, not the result of a policy choice. The
status of a detainee as a prisoner of war is not something dependent upon the
choice of either his or her own State or the detaining power. The initial uncer-
tainty may have contributed to the refusal by the FRY to allow access by the
ICRC to the three until more than three weeks after their capture, a clear
breach of the Convention.40
In passing, it should be noted that, had the force in which the three men
been serving remained a United Nations peacekeeping force, then the answer
would probably have been different. In principle, when a national unit is as-
signed to the United Nations for a mission under United Nations com-
mand—i.e., a “blue beret” operation—the members of the unit are, for the
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duration of their assignment and at least as long as they do not act outside the
scope of the United Nations mandate (e.g., by engaging in surveillance activi-
ties unauthorized by the United Nations), to be considered as United Nations
personnel, not members of the armed forces of their own State. In those cir-
cumstances, they would be protected by the provisions of the Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, assuming that
the States concerned were parties, or the Convention on Privileges and Immu-
nities of 1946.
The position of the FRY soldiers captured by the KLA/UCK is also straight-
forward, at least once they came into the custody of the United States. As-
suming that, at the time of their capture, the conflict between the KLA/UCK
and the FRY was still an internal conflict (a matter considered above), the
captured soldiers did not become prisoners of war when they fell into the
hands of the KLA/UCK, as that status does not apply to prisoners in internal
conflicts. Nevertheless, once they were transferred to the custody of a State
which was engaged in an international armed conflict against their own State,
they fulfilled the requirements of Article 4A(1) of the Third Convention and
were thus entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. It appears that they were
treated as such throughout the time they were held by the United States and
access by the ICRC was allowed in accordance with the Convention.41
The Naval Embargo
By contrast, the naval operations against the FRY gave rise to more serious
legal questions. The focus of discussion was the proposal—in fact never imple-
mented—that the considerable naval forces available in the Adriatic should
prevent shipments of oil to the FRY, even where the oil was being carried by
ships flying the flag of States not involved in the conflict. There was obviously
no obstacle in international law to the NATO States preventing ships flying
their own flags from engaging in this trade.42 Nor was there any such obstacle
where the flag State, though not a member of NATO, consented to NATO
warships intercepting its vessels, as a number of States did. The question
which gave rise to difficulty was whether NATO could lawfully intercept and
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divert ships flying the flag of a neutral State which did not consent to such ac-
tion, such as Russian merchant ships.
The problem was, in part, of a political, rather than a legal, character.
There was an understandable desire on the part of NATO not to risk an esca-
lation of the conflict or further to embitter their relations with Russia. A fur-
ther political complication was that the FRY’s only port, Bar, was in
Montenegro, not Serbia. Throughout the conflict, the Government of
Montenegro sought to distance itself to the greatest extent possible from the
actions of the FRY Federal Government and the Government of Serbia.
While Montenegro, as part of the FRY, could not be regarded as a neutral in
the legal sense of the term, it nevertheless sought something akin to a neutral
status in political terms. NATO, although it bombed some targets in
Montenegro, wished to bolster the position of the Montenegro Government
and thus to minimize military action against Montenegro.
By contrast, international law appeared to present few problems. Although
the matter is not entirely free of controversy, the general view is that the cus-
tomary international law of armed conflict still permits a State engaged in an
international armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil from
reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried in neutral flagged vessels. The
majority view is that that can be done either by the imposition of a blockade43
or by less drastic measures of visit, search and capture designed to prevent the
flow of contraband to an enemy.44 Since the NATO States were engaged in an
armed conflict with the FRY, the imposition of an oil embargo (with or with-
out a general blockade) would, in principle, have been compatible with the jus
in bello.
It would, however, be wrong to dismiss the doubts about the proposed em-
bargo as having no legal basis. Two different legal issues need to be consid-
ered. First, in order to be lawful an oil embargo would have had to comply not
only with the jus in bello but also with the jus ad bellum. A blockade of Saudi
Arabia by the Iraqi navy (had that been possible) during the 1990–91 Gulf
conflict might well have complied with the requirements of the jus in bello but
it would nevertheless have been unlawful, because the entire Iraqi resort to
force contravened the jus ad bellum. The need to comply with the jus ad bellum
is particularly important when the measures in question are taken against
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neutral States. An oil embargo of the FRY would have involved enforcing re-
strictions on the exercise by the shipping of neutral States of the normal rights
of freedom of navigation under international law. Accordingly, while it is nec-
essary to show that those restrictions were compatible with the jus in bello, it is
not sufficient to do so; they must also be within the limits of the jus ad bellum.
The uncertainty about the possible imposition of an oil embargo was there-
fore, for many, the reflection of their uncertainty about whether NATO had a
solid legal justification for resorting to force at all. In addition, even if interna-
tional law does recognize a right to use force by way of humanitarian interven-
tion, it is still necessary to ask whether that extends to the exercise of
belligerent rights over the shipping of neutral States. As was made clear earlier
in this paper, the present writer is firmly of the view that there is a right of hu-
manitarian intervention in an extreme case. Moreover, if international law
permits States to use force in such a case against the State responsible for the
humanitarian crisis, then it is logical that it should also permit the taking of
action which is both necessary and proportionate against neutral shipping to
prevent that State from acquiring supplies needed to continue its human
rights abuses or resist attempts to prevent them. But it is in considerations of
this kind, and not just in references to the traditional rights of belligerents at
sea, that the justification for an oil embargo needed to be found.
Secondly, both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello require that action
taken against neutral shipping be necessary and proportionate. In view of the
limited port facilities at Bar, the difficulty of moving oil from the port to the
rest of the FRY and the relative ease with which the NATO States could have
disrupted links between Bar and the rest of the FRY, it is questionable
whether interference with neutral shipping was really necessary on the facts of
the case.
The Military Presence in Kosovo after June 10, 1999
On June 10, 1999 the NATO airstrikes were suspended and active hostili-
ties came to an end. The FRY Government accepted the principles on a settle-
ment presented to it by the European Union envoy, Mr Ahtisaari, and the
Russian Federation envoy, Mr Chernomyrdin, on June 2, 1999, themselves
based on an earlier set of principles laid down by the G-8 foreign ministers.45
On June 9, 1999, a military technical agreement was concluded between
NATO and FRY commanders. United Nations Security Council Resolution
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1244, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter on June 10, 1999 approved
these steps. The resolution went on, in paragraph 7, to authorize “member
States and relevant international organizations to establish the international
security presence in Kosovo . . . with all necessary means to fulfill its responsi-
bilities.” The responsibilities of KFOR, as the security presence became
known, were set out in paragraph 9 of the resolution as follows:
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into
Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces,
except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
(b) Demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups;
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons
can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a
transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be
delivered;
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can
take responsibility for this task;
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the
international civil presence;
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organisations.
Although NATO was not expressly mentioned, the reference in paragraph 7 to
“relevant international organizations” was clearly intended to mean NATO
and KFOR was, from the start, largely NATO-led. While KFOR derived its le-
gal authority from the Security Council, it was not a United Nations force and
was not subject to United Nations command and control.
By contrast, the international civil presence, UNMIK, was a United Na-
tions body, created and controlled by the United Nations. It is worthwhile
noting UNMIK’s terms of reference. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244 autho-
rized the United Nations Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations (a reference not confined to NATO) to establish a
civil presence:
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[I]n order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for
all inhabitants of Kosovo.
Under paragraph 11, the responsibilities given to the international civil
presence were:
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as
required;
(c) Organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political
settlement, including the holding of elections;
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of
Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future
status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction;
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organisations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces
and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel
to serve in Kosovo;
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo.
Resolution 1244 (1999) is of the utmost importance. By using its powers
under Chapter VII of the Charter to create a civilian administration for
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Kosovo and to authorize an international military presence there, the Security
Council ensured that Kosovo did not fall under a regime which was subject to
the law of belligerent occupation. Whatever the doubts regarding the applica-
bility of international humanitarian law to United Nations military operations
generally,46 the United Nations is not bound by the basic framework of the
law of belligerent occupation (in particular, the duty codified in Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare to respect “unless absolutely pre-
vented” the law in force in the occupied territory) where it establishes a new
administration for a territory after a conflict. To hold otherwise would place a
wholly unreasonable fetter on the power of the Council to provide for political
change in territories such as Kosovo and East Timor. Resolution 1244 has to
be seen as an exercise of that power and the legal regime governing both the
security and civil presences is derived primarily from that Resolution, not from
the law of belligerent occupation.47 That said, individual principles of the law
of belligerent occupation, such as those requiring humane treatment of de-
tainees, would be applicable.
International Proceedings Relating to the Kosovo Conflict
One of the unusual features of the Kosovo conflict was the extent to which
the military operations became the subject of scrutiny by international courts
and tribunals. Three different tribunals have considered different aspects of
the Kosovo conflict (and, at the time of writing, proceedings were continuing
in two of them). While space does not permit a detailed analysis of these pro-
ceedings, it is nonetheless important briefly to consider each of them.
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
International humanitarian law has long expressly provided for its enforce-
ment through criminal proceedings against individuals. Nevertheless, while
the grave breaches machinery established by the Geneva Conventions and
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Protocol I48 requires States to take action in cases of grave breaches and to
bring offenders to justice irrespective of nationality, proceedings of this kind
have in fact been almost unknown. In the case of Kosovo, however, there was
already in existence an international tribunal able to exercise criminal juris-
diction. The ICTY, which was established by United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 827 (1993), had “the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”49 Although drawn up with the
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the early 1990’s in mind, the
Statute was not limited to those conflicts and was clearly applicable to
events in Kosovo (as the Security Council recognized in Resolutions 1160
and 1199 (1998)).
The attacks by the FRY armed forces and police on the majority commu-
nity in Kosovo led to the indictment, on May 22, 1999, by the ICTY Prosecu-
tor of the then FRY President, Slobodan Milosevic, and a number of other
prominent political and military figures on charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.50 While this indictment was dismissed as a political gesture
by Milosevic at the time, the new government of the FRY surrendered him to
the custody of the Tribunal in 2001. At the time of writing, Milosevic was
standing trial on these and other charges.
The Prosecutor also considered that the ICTY had jurisdiction over any se-
rious violations of humanitarian law which might have occurred in the
NATO air campaign. Although her stance in this regard attracted some criti-
cism in political circles, it was plainly correct. The ICTY’s jurisdiction under
Article 1 of its Statute is confined to the territory of the former Yugoslavia but
it is not limited to offenses committed there by Yugoslavs and clearly extends
to offenses by NATO personnel. The Prosecutor established a committee to
inquire into various allegations that NATO forces had violated interna-
tional humanitarian law and to advise whether there was “a sufficient basis
to proceed with an investigation into some or all of the allegations or into
other incidents related to the NATO bombing.”51 The committee concluded
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that no investigation should be commenced.52 The Prosecutor accepted that
recommendation and told the Security Council that:
[T]here is no basis for opening an investigation into any of those allegations or
into other incidents related to the NATO bombing. Although some mistakes
were made by NATO, I am very satisfied that there was no deliberate targeting
of civilians or of unlawful military targets by NATO during the bombing
campaign.53
The committee’s report and the conclusions drawn by the Prosecutor have
attracted much criticism. Most of that criticism has come from those who
wanted to see charges brought against members of the NATO armed forces
and who accused the committee of adopting too lenient a stance in its ap-
praisal of the NATO actions.54 More surprisingly, however, others have criti-
cized the committee for subjecting decisions taken in the heat of the moment
and sometimes in conditions of considerable danger to too close and detached
a scrutiny.55 In the opinion of this writer, both criticisms are misconceived.
The report suggests neither undue leniency nor an excessive dose of hind-
sight. While scrutiny of military decisions with a view to prosecution is never a
comfortable experience for those who might be the subject of charges, it is
what the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I envisage and what has been ap-
plied to non-NATO defendants by the ICTY for several years. What the re-
port shows is that armed forces today cannot expect to be immune from the
kind of legal scrutiny—seeking to apply rules which have long been binding
on all States—which has become commonplace in other walks of life. It also
shows that a body like the committee established by the Prosecutor of the
ICTY is capable of applying those rules in a fair and sensible manner.
2. The International Court of Justice
The NATO air campaign was also the subject of proceedings instituted by
the FRY before the International Court of Justice against ten of the NATO
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States while the campaign was in progress.56 The FRY maintained both that
the NATO resort to force was a violation of the principles of jus ad bellum en-
shrined in the United Nations Charter and that the conduct of the campaign
violated obligations contained in a wide variety of treaties ranging from the
Geneva Conventions to the Convention on Navigation on the River Danube.
In each case the FRY sought provisional measures in the form of an order that
the respondent State should immediately cease military action against the
FRY pending the hearing of the merits. In order to obtain provisional mea-
sures, however, an applicant must demonstrate the existence of a prima facie
basis for jurisdiction on the merits. The Court held, by large majorities, that
the FRY had failed to satisfy this threshold requirement.
The result is scarcely surprising. None of the treaties which were the basis
for the FRY’s substantive claim contain provisions conferring jurisdiction on
the International Court and the two bases for jurisdiction advanced by the
FRY57—Article IX of the Genocide Convention of 1948 (which was invoked
against all the respondents) and Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, the
so-called “Optional Clause” (which was invoked against six out of the
ten)—were rightly rejected by the Court.
Even assuming that the FRY was a party to the Genocide Convention, a po-
sition which it has subsequently repudiated, Article IX manifestly offered no
basis for jurisdiction against Spain and the United States of America, both of
which had entered reservations rejecting the application of that provision
when they became party to the Convention. Moreover, Article IX confers ju-
risdiction only with regard to a dispute “relating to the interpretation,
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application or fulfillment” of the Genocide Convention. Not surprisingly, the
Court held that:
[T]he essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of a
‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’ (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Provisional Measures Order of 13
September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 345, para. 42); . . . the threat or use of force
against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning
of Article II of the Genocide Convention; and . . . in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which
form the subject of the Yugoslav Application ‘indeed entail the element of
intent, towards a group as such, required by [Article II]’ (Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996 (I), p. 240, para.
26).58
In effect, the FRY was seeking to use Article IX of the Genocide Convention as
a device to establish jurisdiction over complaints relating to quite different
agreements. The FRY’s interpretation of the Genocide Convention would
have entailed watering down the crime of genocide to the point that it was de-
prived of its separate identity as the most serious of international crimes.
The other provision relied on by the FRY—Article 36(2) of the Statute of
the Court—could afford jurisdiction only in the event that both the FRY and
the respondent State in question had each made a valid declaration accepting
the Court’s jurisdiction under that provision and the dispute fell within the
scope of both declarations. The FRY had purported to make a declaration un-
der Article 36(2) on April 25, 1999 (a month after the commencement of the
NATO campaign and three days before the FRY filed its applications against
the respondent States). It then sought to rely upon that declaration as a basis
for jurisdiction in the proceedings against those respondent States which had
extant declarations under Article 36(2) (Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom).
In view of the dispute regarding the status of the FRY, the question imme-
diately arose whether the FRY declaration was valid. If, as the Security Coun-
cil and the General Assembly had decided,59 the respondent States claimed
and the FRY has now accepted, the FRY was not at the relevant time a mem-
ber of the United Nations, then it was not a party to the Statute of the Court
and could not have made a valid declaration under Article 36(2) of that
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Statute. The Court, however, understandably chose not to decide that ques-
tion in provisional measures proceedings when there were other, more obvi-
ous, reasons for holding that there was no basis for jurisdiction. In the cases
against Spain and the United Kingdom, Article 36(2) of the Statute could not
have provided a basis for jurisdiction, because those two States had accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court only as between themselves and another State
which had made a similar declaration not less than one year earlier. The FRY’s
declaration, even if valid, plainly did not fulfill that requirement.
The Court’s reason for holding that Article 36(2) did not afford a basis for
jurisdiction in the cases against Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portu-
gal is of more general interest. The FRY declaration accepted the jurisdiction
of the Court as between the FRY and other States with Article 36(2) declara-
tions “in all disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the pres-
ent declaration [i.e., after April 25, 1999], with regard to the situations or
facts subsequent to this signature.”60 The Court held that the dispute which
the FRY wished to bring before the Court had arisen before April 25, 1999.
That was clear from the terms of the FRY applications, which referred primar-
ily to events before that date, and from the debates in the Security Council on
March 24 and 26, 1999 in which the legality of the NATO action was the sub-
ject of extensive discussion. The Court rejected the suggestion that the air
campaign could be sliced up like salami, so that each air raid gave rise to a
fresh dispute. The decision is not a technical one. The temporal reservation in
the FRY’s declaration was carefully drafted to ensure that no proceedings
could be brought against the FRY in respect of the abuses in Kosovo which
had led to the NATO campaign. It was entirely in accordance with precedent
and principle that the FRY was not allowed, in the words of the old saying, “to
have its cake and eat it too.”
The International Court proceedings are, nevertheless, an important re-
minder that military action can be the subject of scrutiny by the International
Court not merely after the action has ended but while it is in progress. Provi-
sional measures proceedings can be brought before the Court in a compara-
tively short time and the Court has now held that an order for provisional
measures is legally binding.61 Since it cannot be assumed that there will always
be a jurisdictional ground for dismissing a request for provisional measures in
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such a case, the possibility clearly exists that States involved in ongoing mili-
tary operations might be forced to defend them before the Court in such pro-
ceedings. The stakes, in such an event, could be very high indeed. Moreover,
the Court’s findings were, for the most part, provisional and, at the time of
writing, the proceedings against all of the respondent States except for Spain
and the United States of America remained on the Court’s list.
3. The European Court of Human Rights
The third proceedings were in the European Court of Human Rights. The
case of Bankovic v. Belgium concerned the attack on the building in Belgrade
housing the studios of Radio Televizije Srbije (RTS).62 That building was hit in
an air raid on April 23, 1999. Sixteen people were killed and sixteen injured.
The application was brought by one of those injured and relatives of some of
those killed against the seventeen NATO States which were also parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights (i.e., all of the NATO States ex-
cept Canada and the United States). The applicants alleged that the attack
had violated the right to life, under Article 2 of the Convention, and the right
to freedom of expression, under Article 10, of those killed or injured. They
maintained that the respondent States were responsible for those violations
even though they had occurred outside the territory of any of them (and, in-
deed, in the territory of a State not party to the European Convention). In ar-
guing that the Convention was not confined to events occurring on the
territory of the States parties, the applicants relied on the decisions in Loizidou
v. Turkey, in which the European Court had held Turkey responsible for viola-
tions of the Convention occurring in the north of Cyprus where large numbers
of Turkish forces have been stationed since 1974 and in which the Court
found that Turkey exercised effective control.63 In addition they argued that
the respondents were responsible for the alleged violations irrespective of
which State’s forces had actually carried out the attack, because they con-
tended that NATO operated on the basis that any NATO State could have
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vetoed the decision to attack the RTS building.64 In doing so, they high-
lighted the whole issue of the geographical extent of the European Conven-
tion and its applicability to operations involving the armed forces of States
party to the Convention which occur outside the territory of those States.
The case also raised important questions about the relationship between
the principles of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. The applicants contended that human rights law and international
humanitarian law were not mutually exclusive and denied that military opera-
tions in an international armed conflict were governed solely by humanitarian
law.65 The first argument of the applicants was that the legality of the attack
on the RTS building had to be assessed by reference to provisions of the Euro-
pean Convention, quite independently of whether that attack complied with
international humanitarian law, although they also contended, in the alterna-
tive, that the Convention in effect incorporated the principles of humanitar-
ian law, so that the Convention would have been violated if the attack on the
RTS building had been in breach of international humanitarian law.
These are arguments of very considerable breadth which, had they been ac-
cepted, would radically have altered the legal framework within which mili-
tary operations have to be conducted. A Grand Chamber of the Court,66
however, rejected the applicants’ arguments and unanimously declared the
application inadmissible. The Grand Chamber accepted the respondents’ ar-
gument that the case fell outside the scope of the Convention. Article 1 of the
Convention defines that scope by providing that “the High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section I of this Convention.” The Court held that this pro-
vision reflected a largely (though not exclusively) territorial concept of
jurisdiction and that it was only in exceptional cases that persons outside the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties would be considered as falling
within the jurisdiction of that Party. The Court contrasted Article 1 of the Eu-
ropean Convention with common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions,
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under which “the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” The parties to the
Geneva Conventions were expressly required to respect the Conventions in
all their military operations and could be held responsible for any failure on
the part of their forces anywhere in the world to observe those Conventions.
By contrast, Article 1 of the European Convention was clearly narrower and
imposed responsibility only in respect of treatment of a person who was within
the jurisdiction of the State concerned at the relevant time. The Court held
that a person was not to be treated as falling within the jurisdiction of a State
merely because he or she was affected by the military operations of that State’s
forces.
The Bankovic judgment removed the possibility that military operations by
the European members of NATO would henceforth be measured not only
against the yardstick of international humanitarian law but also by reference
to the very different standards of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Indeed, had the applicants’ arguments been accepted it would not only
have been NATO that would have been affected. Coalition military opera-
tions in the Gulf and United Nations operations in, for example, East Timor
would also presumably have come within the purview of the European Court
and the provisions of a regional human rights treaty would have been superim-
posed on the requirements of international humanitarian law. The Court did
not reverse its earlier decisions in the Cyprus cases, but it noted that the cir-
cumstances in Cyprus were unusual in that both Cyprus and Turkey were par-
ties to the European Convention so that the inhabitants of northern Cyprus
should not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by reason of the
changes brought about by the Turkish intervention of 1974. It remains to be
seen what attitude the Court would take in a case where armed forces of a
party to the European Convention occupied territory of a non-Convention
country.
Conclusions
The Kosovo conflict raised important questions about the jus in bello in ad-
dition to the difficult issues of the jus ad bellum which have already attracted so
much attention. Indeed, in one sense the former group of questions are more
important, because they may have a wider impact. Although, for the reasons
given above, the Kosovo conflict was unusual in certain respects (notably its
asymmetric character), many of the lessons learned should be relevant to fu-
ture conflicts.
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The following conclusions seem warranted:
1. International humanitarian law applies to a conflict between two or
more States irrespective of what that conflict is called or the cause for
which force is used; the use of force by way of humanitarian
intervention is no different in this respect from the use of force for
other purposes.
2. While the jus ad bellum requires that the use of force be proportionate
to the goals which the State or States using force are permitted to
pursue, that does not mean that the jus in bello principles on such
issues as targeting are to be interpreted or applied differently and it
should never be used as an excuse to undermine the principle of the
equal application of the jus in bello.
3. Members of the armed forces of a party to an international conflict
who find themselves in the power of the enemy are prisoners of war,
irrespective of the purpose for which the conflict is waged, whether
prisoner of war status is claimed on their behalf or how or where they
were captured.
4. It might have been lawful for the NATO States to have imposed an
oil embargo on the FRY but the legal issues involved went beyond a
simple application of the law of neutrality.
5. The KFOR and UNMIK presence in Kosovo pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) was not governed by the law of
belligerent occupation.
6. Scrutiny by international courts and tribunals of military operations
was a fact of life even before the establishment of the International
Criminal Court. The approach of the three tribunals which
considered the conduct of the Kosovo conflict suggests that much of
the concern which has been expressed on this subject is misplaced.
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